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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
construed as prospective only. If this is correct, the effectiveness of the Act
as to the number of surface owners it may protect is greatly reduced.
The Act does not prohibit independent contracting as to surface damages.
This was true under the common law as well. It has been recognized as a
matter of judicial notice that most modern leases contain surface damage
clauses.8 9 It has been common practice for operators to compensate surface
owners for surface use. This practice in all probability will continue despite
the existence of the Act. While this practice suggests that the Act was un-
necessary to protect surface owners, it also suggests that the Act will actually
serve to protect only a small number of surface owners. In this sense the
Act serves merely to complicate the contractual arrangements of the parties
by requiring such things as bond and notice of intent to drill.
In those rare instances in which the Act will actually serve to protect a
surface owner, the ambiguities within it will complicate rather than simplify
the relationship of the parties. In view of these ambiguities and the severity
of treble damages for mistakes, the oil and gas operator is in a precarious
situation in conducting his drilling operations. As a major oil- and gas-
producing state, Oklahoma should reconsider the desirability of this Act.
L. Mark Walker
Author's Note: Prior to publication, Judge Thomas R. Brett ruled that the
Act may not be constitutionally applied to leases executed prior to the effec-
tive date of the Act. [Hughes Group v. Morgan, Docket No. 82-C-995-BT,
U.S.D.C. (N. D. Okla. 1983)] Although the decision will not be reported and
therefore will not create a precedent, it may be indicative of the court's response
to the Act and will be persuasive authority in future cases.
Taxation: Like-Kind Exchanges of Partnership
Interests: Availability of § 1031 and Effect of
Nonqualifying Property*
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (hereafter Code), section 1031 (a)' pro-
vides an exception to the general rule requiring recognition of gain or loss
upon the sale or exchange of property.' Under this section, no gain or loss
89. See Marland Oil Co. v. Hubbard, 168 Okla. 518, 519, 34 P.2d 278, 279 (1934).
* This paper received the F.C. Love Scholarship Award for 1983, presented to its author
on Law Day, April 15, 1983 at the College of Law. The Award is made on the basis of high
academic performance and promise, especially as shown by the recipient's devotion to the craft
of legal writing.-Ed.
1. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
2. See Code § 1001 and the regulations thereunder for the general rules requiring recogni-
tion of gain upon sale or exchange of property.
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is recognized if property held for productive use in a trade or business or
for investment is exchanged solely for property of a like-kind to be held either
for productive use in a trade or business or for investment. This provision
has the effect of deferring the income tax impact of a realized gain or loss
until disposition of the acquired property.3
In recent years, taxpayers have asserted the applicability of this section to the
exchange of partnership interests. The basis for this assertion is that partner-
ship interests are "properties" being exchanged and that such "properties"
are held for investment. Taxpayers further contend that the partnership in-
terests involved are of a "like-kind," making the nonrecognition of gain or
loss provisions applicable. This results in the exchange being either tax-free
or only partially taxable. Predictably, the Internal Revenue Service rejects these
arguments and has consistently denied section 1031 deferral treatment in ex-
changes of partnership interests.4 Upon litigation, however, the Tax Court
has been much more receptive to the taxpayer's position and has held that,
in certain circumstances, an exchange of partnership interests will qualify for
section 1031 treatment.'
Because of the conflicting positions taken by the Tax Court and the Com-
missioner, it is important to understand the considerations involved when tradi-
tional problems inherent in partnership taxation6 intersect with the specific
nonrecognition of gain or loss requirements of section 1031. The purpose of
this note is to discuss the prevalent tax considerations existing when a partner
in one partnership wishes to exchange his interest for an interest in another
partnership pursuant to section 1031.
Availability of Section 1031
The first issue that must be addressed is whether partnership interests can
even be considered for section 1031 nonrecognition treatment. This question
3. The deferral effect is accomplished by § 1031(d), which provides that the basis in ac-
quired property shall be the basis of the property exchanged decreased by the amount of any
money received by the taxpayer and increased in the amount of gain or decreased by the amount
of loss recognized on the exchange. If the taxpayer were to sell the acquired asset immediately,
gain would then be recognized to the full extent of the difference between the taxpayer's basis
and the amount realized. This again represents the amount not recognized under § 1031, thereby
providing a deferral until the disposition of the acquired property.
A similar deferral occurs under other nonrecognition provisions, including: § 1032 (exchange
of stock for property), § 1034 (sale or exchange of a residence), § 1035 (certain exchanges of
insurance policies), § 1036 (stock for stock of same corporation), § 1037 (certain exchanges of
United States obligations), § 1038 (certain reacquisitions of real property), § 1039 (certain sales
of low-income housing projects).
4. See, e.g., Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045 (1981).
6. Many problems arising in partnership taxation result from indecision about whether to
treat the partnership as a separate entity or simply as an aggregation of the individual partners.
For a general discussion of both approaches, see 1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE,
FEDERAL TAxATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, 1.02 (1977); 1 A. WILLIS. J. PENNELL,
P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION §§ 2.04-2.09 (3d ed. 1982).
1983]
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arises because of the parenthetical language in section 1031 providing that
certain property is excluded from nonrecognition treatment. Excluded property
includes "stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale, . . . stocks,
bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or beneficial interest, or
other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest."' The Commissioner
contends that a partnership interest is specifically excluded by this language.
Revenue Ruling 78-1358 posited that this language encompasses all types of
equity interests in financial enterprises other than direct ownership of the
underlying property. The ruling concluded that because a partnership interest
represents such an equity interest, it comes within the ambit of the exclu-
sionary clause.9 In every case thus far presented to the Tax Court, the Com-
missioner has argued that a partnership interest should be characterized either
as a "chose in action"'0 or an "evidence of . . . interest."" On each occa-
sion, the Tax Court has rejected such arguments because they would limit
the scope of section 1031 by excluding partnership interests.'2 Upon judicial
review of the legislative history of the statute, the Tax Court held that part-
nership interests were simply not property that Congress intended the paren-
thetical language to exclude.'3 In the recent case of Pappas v. Commissioner,"
this reasoning led the Tax Court summarily to dismiss this facet of the Com-
missioner's argument by citing precedent indicating that the government's posi-
tion will be rejected when applied to the exchange of general partnership
interests." Such cursory treatment indicates that the Tax Court is attempting
to put this contention permanently to rest.
In Pappas the court also addressed another issue raised by the Commis-
sioner that would preclude application of section 1031. In that case, the tax-
payer was involved in two exchanges of general partnership interests. In each
7. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
8. 1978-1 C.B. 256.
9. Id. at 257.
10. Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311, 312 (1972). See infra text accompanying note 30.
After Meyer, the IRS abandoned this argument.
11. See, e.g., Gulfstream Land & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587, 593 (1979).
12. For a detailed discussion, see Banoff & Fried, An Analysis of Recent LR.S. Attempts
to Narrow the Scope of the Tax-Free Like-Kind Exchange, 51 J. TAX'N 66 (1979).
13. It should be noted that the court's discussion regarding the initial qualification of a part-
nership interest has been limited to general partnership interests. As discussed later, limited part-
nership interests could possibly be characterized so as to fall within the exclusion. See infra text
accompanying notes 35-41.
The court determined that the purpose of the parenthetical language is to prevent taxpayers
who own appreciated investment securities from exchanging them for other investment securities
without recognizing gain. Otherwise, taxpayers would be allowed to defer gain recognition on
appreciated securities by exchanging them, while currently recognizing losses on sales of depreciated
securities. See Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311, 313 (1972).
The court's conclusion is supported by the legislative history of the Revenue Act of Mar.
4, 1923, which introduced the earliest predecessor of the parenthetical exclusion language. See
H.R. REP. No. 1432, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 1 (1923); 64 CONG. REc. 2852-54 (1923) (remarks
of Representatives Green, Garner, and Fordney).
14. 78 T.C. 1078 (1982).
15. Id. at 1085.
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transaction, he acquired a 50% interest in the target partnership, thereby
resulting in his becoming the sole owner of the partnership.'6 In addition to
the parenthetical exclusion issue, the government asserted that section 74117
requires that gain or loss be recognized when partnership interests are ex-
changed, notwithstanding section 1031, because section 741 and section 1031
are conflicting provisions'8 and section 741 overrides section 1031 because of
its greater specificity.' 9 The court squarely addressed this issue for the first
time"0 and concluded that these sections are not conflicting. The court held
that section 1031 is a nonrecognition provision while section 741 is a
characterization provision. Therefore, the characterization provision only
becomes operative when gain recognition occurs in order to determine the
character of such gain. If there is no gain under the nonrecognition provi-
sions of section 1031, section 741 remains dormant.2' The court reasoned that
the legislative history of section 741 emphasizes characterization and not
recognition,22 that the regulations do not support the Commissioner's
argument,2 and that precedent supports this approach.
4
In Revenue Ruling 78-135, two arguments were advanced to preclude the
application of section 1031. As mentioned above, the first argument was
predicated upon the parenthetical property exclusion in section 1031(a) and
the second was the section 741 argument. Considering the Tax Court's con-
sistent position that a general partnership interest is not automatically excluded
by the parenthetical clause of section 103 1(a), and viewing the court's specific
rejection of the section 741 argument in Pappas, one must wonder whether
the ruling reflects the Commissioner's current position.25 In any event, it ap-
16. The underlying assets involvedin the exchange will be addressed later. See infra text
accompanying notes 46-49. The focus of this discussion is first to determine whether an exchange
of partnership interests may be considered for § 1031 treatment. If so, issues relating to the
operative language of this section come into play and the underlying assets become a factor.
17. I.R.C. § 741. This section provides that gain or loss recognized on the sale or exchange
of a partnership interest shall be treated as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset.
18. Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1086 (1982).
19. For other examples of application of this rule of construction, see Ginsberg & Sons v.
Popkin, 285 U.S. 204 (1932); Essenfeld v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 117, 123 (1961), aff'd 311
F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1962).
20. Although Pappas was the first case that confronted the § 741 issue, it was by no means
the first time the issue was raised by the Commissioner. In fact, this contention was raised in
every prior case involving partnership exchanges, but only impliedly overruled. See Pappas v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1087 (1982).
21. Id. at 1086-87.
22. H.R. REP. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A232 (1954). See also S. REP. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 376 (1954).
23. Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1087 (1982).
24. Id.
25. 1978-1 C.B. 256. The advance sheets containing the Pappas opinion indicated that the
Commissioner conceded at trial that the taxpayer's first exchange of one general partnership
interest for another with identical underlying assets was nontaxable. In the official opinion, however,
the concession is reversed and the taxpayer concedes that the first exchange was taxable, thereby
resulting in a short-term capital loss of $497.59. Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1088
(1982).
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pears firmly established that an exchange of partnership interests may be initial-
ly considered under section 1031 to determine if it qualifies for nonrecognition
treatment. However, taxpayers should be cognizant of the Internal Revenue
Service's persistence in this area when attempting to apply section 1031 to
such an exchange.
Tier One Analysis
Although it appears that an exchange of partnership interests is not
automatically excluded from section 1031, the exchange must qualify under
the operative language of section 1031(a) before nonrecognition treatment is
available. The determination as to whether a particular exchange qualifies is
made especially difficult because of the idiosyncrasies of partnership entities.
For example, should the requirements of section 1031(a) be applied to the
partnership interests, the underlying assets of the partnership, or both?
In each Tax Court case involving these issues,26 that forum has either express-
ly or implicitly applied a two-tier analysis to determine whether an exchange
qualifies under section 1031. The first tier is applied to the partnership in-
terests. In order for nonrecognition treatment to apply, the tests at both tiers
must be satisfied. Tier-two analysis is applied to the underlying partnership
assets and involves many questions that, until recently, have remained unad-
dressed by the court.
The court first examines the partnership interests exchanged in order to
ascertain if they are of a like-kind. 27 The reasoning used by the court is that
section 1031(a) applies only to the "property" being exchanged. The court
has treated the partnership interests, and not the underlying partnership assets,
as the "property" exchanged.28 In adopting this approach, the court is using
an entity theory of partnerships in analyzing the problem. Accordingly, the
court has held that the "determination of whether the exchange initially
qualifies as like-kind . . will be applied to the partnership interests and not
on a partnership-asset-by-partnership-asset approach."' 29 It thus appears that
the court could base its determination upon whether the exchanged interests
are general for limited, limited for limited, or general for general.
In Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner,3" the first Tax Court case to present
26. The first court to be presented with this issue was a district court. In Miller v. United
States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cases (CCH) 9606 (S.D. Ind. 1963), the court held that an exchange
of interests in general partnerships conducting different types of retail business was an exchange
of like-kind property and no gain should be recognized. Both partnerships owned inventory and
notes which, if exchanged directly, would have been ineligible for § 1031 treatment.
It should be noted that this is an unreported decision, and the court reached its holding without
citing any relevant authority or providing detailed analysis. Accordingly, the precedential value
of this case is doubtful.
27. The court has so far presumed that the partnership interests exchanged were held for
investment purposes.
28. Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311, 313 (1972).
29. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1068 (1981).
30. 58 T.C. 311 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974). The Commissioner
has not acquiesced to this holding. See 1975-1 C.B. 3.
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the issue of tax-free exchanges of partnership interests, a father and his son
each exchanged general partnership interests in a general partnership for in-
terests in a limited partnership. The father received a limited partner interest
and his son received a general partner interest. Prior to and after the exchange,
both partnerships were principally engaged in the ownership and operation
of rental apartments. The court held that although the son's exchange qualified
for nonrecognition under section 1031(a), the father's exchange of a general
partnership interest for a limited partnership interest was not an exchange
"of property of like-kind." 3' The court reasoned that:
The differences in the characteristics of the interest of a general
partner and that of a limited partner are considerable.... [T]hat
a limited partner, unlike a general partner, is not personally liable
for partnership debts and that he is entitled to priority in liquida-
tion are the law in [this jurisdiction]. [Citations omitted.] Also,
absent agreement to the contrary the death of a limited partner
does not work a dissolution of the limited partnership.
32
Meyer has been cited for this proposition by the court in every subsequent
case presenting the issue of "partnership-swapping" under section 1031 .33 In
Pappas the court stated that "it is well established that . . . an exchange
... of a general partnership interest for a limited partnership interest is not
an exchange of property of like-kind. ' 34 Such statements are indicative of
the tax consequences resulting when the interests exchanged are characterized
as general for limited.
Although no case has directly posed the problem, an exchange of a limited
partnership interest for another limited partnership interest could possibly fall
within the parenthetical exclusion of section 1031(a) because limited partner-
ship interests have several characteristics3 ' normally associated with securities,
and securities are specifically denied like-kind treatment.36 Such characteristics
31. 58 T.C. at 314. As discussed infra, beginning with the text accompanying note 46, infra,
the majority indicated that the crucial factor in determining whether § 1031 should apply is the
second-tier analysis relating to the underlying assets of the partnership. Judge Dawson vigor-
ously dissented, arguing that the underlying assets of the partnerships involved were virtually
the same (rental real estate). Id. at 315. He concluded that because the underlying property was
the same, the distinction made by the.majority was merely one of quality, grade, or value. Such
distinctions do not prevent property being like-kind, according to the regulations at § 1.1031(a)-
(l)(b). See Banoff & Fried, supra note 12, at 71.
32. Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311, 314 (1972).
33. See, e.g., Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1084 (1982); Long v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 1045, 1064 (1981); Gulfstrean Land & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587, 592 (1979).
34. 78 T.C. 1078, 1084 (1982).
35. In discussing the various characteristics of a security for § 1031 purposes, it is assumed
that the court will use the criteria associated with federal securities law and not those employed
for federal income tax purposes. (i.e., not I.R.C. § 1236(c)). See Banoff & Fried, supra note
12, at 69.
36. This attack could also be used in an exchange of a general partnership interest for a
limited one, as was the case in Meyer. However, the court decided that case without having
to address the issue of whether the limited interest constituted a security for § 1031 purposes.
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include the limited partner's inability to actively participate in the partner-
ship's business and his limited degree of liability. As the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit pointed out in affirming the Tax Court's decision in
Meyer, an individual with a limited partnership interest might reasonably be
regarded as "an investor, dependent upon the efforts of others to make a
profit. '" 3 The effect of this statement is clear when viewed in the context
of federal securities law,38 which generally provides that if an investor has
no control over the management of the enterprise and looks to the efforts
of others for profit, he is considered to hold a security.", Moreover, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has stated that a limited partnership in-
terest in a real estate venture will generally constitute a security under the
Securities Act of 1933.40 Accordingly, potential characterization of the limited
partner's interest as a security must be considered when limited partnership
interests are involved in a like-kind exchange."
The final possibility is an exchange of a general partnership interest for
another general partnership interest. As mentioned, this type of exchange
repeatedly has been approved by the Tax Court. Nonetheless, a partnership
interest nominally general could possibly be recharacterized by the Commis-
sioner as a limited partnership interest. Under Meyer, such an exchange would
not qualify as like-kind, rendering section 1031 inapplicable. The most likely
basis for recharacterization of a general partnership interest is when it, in
substance, has many of the intrinsic traits of a limited partnership interest.2
37. Meyer v. Commiusioner, 58 T.C. 311, 558 (1972), aff'd 503 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
38. See supra note 35.
39. See SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), which sets out four specific criteria for
determining if a particular interest is a security.
40. S.E.C. Rel. No. 33-4877, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,705 (1967). A conspicuous target of this argu-
ment would be partnership units actively traded on an exchange.
41. Various methods of countering the "security attack" to the limited partnership interest
have been made. One involves structuring the partnership agreement so that the limited partner
has the right to become a general partner and assume an active role in management if the part-
nership's business deteriorates beyond a specified point. It would be logical to assert that the
existence of this right makes the limited partner more than a mere investor. See Chromow, Tax-
Free Exchanges of Partnership Interests: Gulfstream Land and Rev. Rul. 78-135 Impose Con-
straints, 57 TAXEs 651, 657 (1979).
Another argument postulated is that the purpose of the parenthetical language in § 1031 is
to exclude liquid investments that are readily convertible into cash. Because limited partnership
interests are generally illiquid, they should not be treated as securities for section 1031 purposes.
See Duhl, Like-Kind Exchanges Under Section 1031: Multiparty Exchanges, Nonsimultaneous
Exchanges and Exchanges of Partnership Interests, 58 TAXES 949, 963 (1980).
42. This attempt was made in Long v. Commissioner and rejected under those facts. In Long,
the Commissioner argued that the general interest traded was a limited interest because: the tax-
payer was not personally liable on the mortgages of the partnership; the partnership agreement
provided that the taxpayer-partners would not be required to make any further capital contribu-
tions; and the agreement further provided that the taxpayer was to recover his initial investment
plus interest upon dissolution and liquidation of the partnership.
In rejecting this argument, the court found it dispositive that the partnership was not formed
as a limited partnership under applicable state law. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1065
(1981).
[Vol. 36
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Another possible reason for recharacterization arises where the taxpayer
engages in a number of general partnership exchanges,4 3 eventually owning
an interest in a limited partnership directly or indirectly." Depending upon
the circumstances, the Commissioner could assert one of several judicially
created doctrines to view the exchange as a single transaction in which a limited
partnership interest was acquired.5 Thus, the fact that general partnership
interests are being exchanged should not lull one into a sense of security in
dealing with first-tier analysis of partnership interests under section 1031.
Tier Two Analysis
Assuming that the partnership interests exchanged are of a "like-kind,"
and are not e~tcluded from section 1031(a) by its parenthetical language, the
second-tier analysis must be applied. This analysis scrutinizes the underlying
assets of the partnership interests exchanged. The primary purpose of this
scrutiny is to prevent abuse of section 1031 by taxpayers attempting to obtain
nonrecognition treatment by contributing nonqualifying property to partner-
ships, then exchanging partnership interests." However, the scope and result
of such "abuse" has not yet been addressed by either the Tax Court or the
Internal Revenue Service." The uncertainties in this tier of the analysis result
from two factors: (1) the consistent position of the Tax Court in allowing
section 1031 to. apply to an exchange of partnership interests,"' and (2) apply-
ing the requirements of section 1031 to a partnership despite its somewhat
amorphous nature.
One of the uncertainties in the second-tier analysis involves the effect of
property excluded by the parenthetical clause in section 1031(a) held by the
partnership. Three possibilities exist, the first being that the presence of any
such excluded assets would totally preclude application of section 1031. The
43. A potential argument as yet unused by the Commissioner may apply when a taxpayer
exchanges so many partnership interests within a relatively short period that he can no longer
be considered an investor. This would result in his being treated as a dealer in such interests
with the interest consisting of "stock in trade" which is specifically excluded from § 1031 treat-
ment. Like the "security attack," this would have the effect of precluding nonrecognition treat-
ment in the first-tier analysis.
44. This argument was presented and rejected under the facts of Pappas v. Commissioner,
78 T.C. 1078, 1085 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g 315 F. Supp.
814 (N.D. Ga. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972) ("substance over form," "step trans-
action"); Harris v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 770, 782-83 (1974) ("substance over form," "step
transaction"); Seyburn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 578, 582-83 (1969) ("substance over form,"
"assignment of incolne").
46. See, e.g., Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1069 (1981).
47. Of course, as long as the official position of the Internal Revenue Service, as expressed
in Rev. Rul. 78-135, 1978-1 C.B. 256, is to not recognize partnership interests as qualifying for
§ 1031 treatment, no Treasury Regulations will be forthcoming.
48. All uncertainty would have been eliminated if the court had originally agreed with the
Commissioner that § 1031 is inapplicable to such exchanges. The unstated reason of the court
for allowing its application appears to be that nonrecognition treatment should not be disallowed
on an exchange that would otherwise qualify merely because of the partnership form.
19831
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second alternative is that such assets would not preclude application, but non-
qualifying property would instead be isolated and treated as "boot" under
section 1031(b).4 9 The final possibility is that existence of such property within
the partnership would have no effect on the transaction, either as boot or
by precluding nonrecognition treatment, unless the nonqualifying assets com-
prise a significant portion of the total underlying assets exchanged. Recent
decisions indicate a strong preference for the last alternative.
In Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. v. Commissioner,° an interest
in one joint venture was exchanged for an interest in another." Both joint
ventures had been formed to develop and improve land and to build homes
thereon for sale. The Commissioner argued that the underlying assets con-
sisted of "stock in trade," an excluded asset, as well as real estate.2 The
court held that, in accordance with Meyer,5 3 it "will apply the judicial doc-
trine that the form of a transaction will not be given effect for tax purposes
if the substance of the transaction would yield a contrary tax result.""4 The
court then found that whether the partnership's property constituted "stock
in trade" was an unresolved issue of material fact compelling a denial of the
taxpayer's motion for partial summary judgment. Gulfstream indicates that
section 1031 is inapplicable to an exchange if a substantial amount of the
underlying property consists of excluded assets.5 The inverse corollary of this
proposition is that, if a substantial amount of the underlying assets is quali-
49. Code § 1031(b) provides that if nonlike-kind property is received in an exchange other-
wise qualifying for nonrecognition treatment, any gain realized by the recipient shall be recognized
to the extent of the sum of the money and the fair market value of the nonlike-kind property
received.
For a discussion of the technical difficulties involved if a court were to isolate excluded assets
and treat them as boot, see Chromow, supra note 41.
50. 71 T.C. 587 (1979).
51. Code § 761(a) provides that a joint venture falls within the definition of a partnership
for federal income tax purposes. See Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1064 (1981) (Com-
missioner's contention that an exchange of a partnership interest in return for a joint venture
interest was not like-kind for purposes of § 1031(a) was rejected).
52. Gulfstream Land & Dev. Co. v Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587, 591 (1979).
53. Although this was the first time the "substance over form" doctrine was articulated in
this context, the court stated that it was inferred in the concluding paragraph of the Meyer opin-
ion. That paragraph confined the court's decision (that an exchange of general partnership inter-
ests qualified as like-kind) to situations where both partnerships owned the same type of under-
lying assets. The court expressed no opinion as to the result if varying types of underlying assets
were involved or if there were variations in the nature of the partnerships' businesses. Meyer
v. Commissioner, 58"T.C. 311, 314 (1972).
In Gulfstream, the court asserted that its examination of the underlying assets in Meyer and
its conclusion of fact that they were like-kind (rental real estate) was an application of this judicial
doctrine.
54. Gulfstream Land & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587, 595 (1979). For support,
the court cited Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924);
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968).
55. The Gulfstream facts present an obvious example of the type of abuse the court sought
to prohibit. All of the underlying assets in both joint ventures consisted of developed realty
held for sale to customers.
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fying property, section 1031 applies to the exchange.6 This is the third alter-
native presented to the court and appears to be the position taken by the
court in Long v. Commissioner.-
7
In Long the Tax Court's primary concern was the taxpayer's manipulation
of partnership liabilities to prevent gain recognition by virtue of the liability-
netting rules of section 1031(d).0 However, a portion of the underlying assets
in both partnerships consisted of property excluded by the parenthetical phrase
of section 1031(a).9 Although the court held that any gain realized must be
recognized to the extent of net liabilities relieved, it did not segregate non-
qualifying property and treat it as boot, nor did the existence of such assets
preclude nonrecognition treatment. The rationale for this result appears to
be that existence of a normal amount of cash in a partnership does not con-
stitute abuse of section 1031(a).0 Accordingly, Long demonstrates that if the
amount of excluded property in the underlying assets exchanged is insubstan-
tial, nonrecognition treatment should still be available. The court, however,
issued a caveat that "all contributions of property to a partnership and in-
debtedness incurred at or near the time of the exchange will be carefully
scrutinized . . . to insure that such activities are not undertaken for tax
avoidance purposes."' 6' The court further stated that it would not hesitate
to apply judicially created theories such as the "sham" and "step" transac-
tion doctrines. The court's admonition is targeted, at least in part, to those
taxpayers whowould inflate liabilities or contribute cash to the partnership
in an attempt to make the exchanges of equal value without the payment of
boot.
Aside from uncertainties relating to the presence of parenthetical property
in the underlying assets exchanged, another uncertainty exists in the second-
tier analysis. This uncertainty involves the effect of nonlike-kind property
in the underlying partnership assets exchanged. These are assets which, though
not excluded by the parenthetical language, would not otherwise qualify as
like-kind under section 1031(a) because similar property is not held by the
other partnership. Although this problem is much like the issue relating to
56. Meyer provides support, albeit tenuous, for this proposition. The court allowed § 1031
treatment to -the son's exchange, noting that "both partnerships had as their principal activities
the ownership and operation of rental apartments ... " Meyer, 58 T.C. at 312 (emphasis added).
Although the court mentions the "principal activities," it expresses neither the percentage amount
nor the nature of other partnership operations involved.
57. 77 T.C. 1045 (1981).
58. I.R.C. § 1031(d). This provision provides for trie netting of liabilities relieved against
liabilities assumed in a section 1031 transaction. In the event that the amount of debt relieved
exceeds debt assumed, such amount will be treated as money received and result in possible
gain recognition.
59. According to the balance sheets of the entities, 77 T.C. at 1060-61, in Long, 80,953/2,008,791
of the underlying assets exchanged represented cash while 6,301/963,769 of the underlying assets
received represented cash.
60. If considered nonabusive, the same rationale would seem to apply to other parenthetically
excluded property (securities, stock in trade, etc.).
61. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1072 n.8 (1981).
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the presence of excluded property, some authorities assert that this issue should
be addressed differently.6 2 However, the alternatives as to treatment of nonlike-
kind assets are the same as those available when dealing with excluded property.
Case law indicates that the existence of nonlike-kind property in the underly-
ing assets will have no effect on the application of section 1031, as boot or
otherwise, unless it represents a substantial portion of the exchanged assets.
In Pappas the taxpayer was involved in two exchanges of general partner-
ship interests. In the first exchange, the underlying assets of the partnerships
whose interests were exchanged were identical.63 However, the second exchange
involved receipt of an interest in a partnership containing personal property
and realty in exchange for an interest in a partnership that owned only realty."
It was stipulated that, except for the personal property involved, all of the
underlying assets in the second exchange were property of a "like-kind" within
the meaning of section 1031(a). The Commissioner did not assert that section
1031 was inapplicable to the exchange,61 but instead contended.that he boot
provisions of section 1031(b) should be applied to the dissimilar assets.
66
The court held that the taxpayer need not recognize any gain realized from
the exchange of these general partnership interests except for liabilities assumed
taxable as boot.67 However, in doing so, it appears that the court disposed
of the Commissioner's contention by answering an unasked question. In its
holding, the court stated that the personal property involved was clearly not
stock in trade as may have existed in Gulfstream. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that it could not be excluded from nonrecognition under section 1031 (a)
nor considered boot under section 1031(b). 8 Although the court held that
the personal property was not excluded by the parenthetical clause in section
1031(a), it did not specifically address the issue relating to treatment of nonlike-
kind underlying assets. Nonetheless, Pappas provides precedent for the proposi-
62. The American Law Institute, in its income tax proposals relating to subchapter K, recom-
mends such differing treatment. Under its proposals, parenthetically excluded property is to be
isolated. Then, if substantially all of the assets of the two partnerships are of a like-kind, the
exchange qualifies under § 1031. "Substantially all" of the assets means 90% of the gross assets
of the partnership exclusive of cash, securities, and stock. These excluded assets are treated similar
to debt assumed and relieved, and are netted against each other to the extent each is in existence
in the exchanging partnerships. If the amount of these assets received exceeds the amount ex-
changed, then gain will be recognized to the full extent it would be without regard to § 1031.
See Like-Kind Exchanges of Partnership Interests, 4 A.L.I. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT 36
(1980).
63. See supra note 25.
64. The personal property consisted of furniture and fixtures in the amount of $13,500. The
total value of the partnership interest received by Pappas was $74,750. Therefore, dissimilar
assets represented more than 18% of the partnership and would therefore not qualify for nonrec-
ognition treatment under the A.L.I. rules. See supra note 62.
65. This was the first alternative mentioned in dealing with the effect of excluded property
in the underlying assets of partnership interests exchanged. Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
1078 (1982).
66. Id. This was the second alternative mentioned in the same context as note 65, supra.
67. Id. at 1089. See infra text accompanying notes 75-86, for the court's treatment of excess
liabilities assumed.
68. Id. at 1088.
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tion that an insubstantial amount of dissimilar assets in the underlying property
of the partnership interests exchanged has no effect on section 1031 treatment.
Further support for this approach is found in Long.69 The court, when
discussing its justification for deciding that gain recognized under section
1031(b) should be computed using the entity theory, stated: "[D]ue to the
requirement that the underlying assets of each partnership be of a like-kind,
there is a substantial probability that the balance sheets of the exchanged part-
nerships will be similar, thus reducing any inequities which might otherwise
result from the entity approach. . .. "I'
The court thus appears to indicate that in order for the underlying assets
to be of a like-kind, they need not be identical but only similar. Moreover,
the underlying assets in both partnerships whose interests were exchanged in
Long consisted of personalty and realty of varying amounts." The court stated
that "it [was] beyond dispute that the predominant underlying properties of
both partnerships were substantially the same, as they were both residential
rental apartment complexes held for investment."2 Therefore, neither the ex-
istence of personalty in an exchange predominantly of realty nor the inequality
of amounts of personalty in each exchanged partnership interest precluded
section 1031 treatment.
73
The result in Long and Pappas appears to be consistent with the court's
second-tier analysis regarding the existence of parenthetically excluded
property.7 However, the court's caveat in Long is equally applicable to the
contribution of dissimilar property to the partnership as it is to the contribu-
tion of excluded assets at or near the time of exchange. Presumably, the court
would not hesitate to apply the "substance over form" doctrine should it
determine abuse had occurred.
Relief of Liabilities
Assuming that an exchange passes both tiers of the court's analysis and
no other property is received in the exchange outside of the partnership in-
69. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1072 (1981).
70. Id. (emphasis added). See also infra note 82 for other reasons advanced by the court
to support application of the entity theory.
71. Id. More than 14% of the underlying assets exchanged consisted of furniture and fix-
tures, while the personalty comprising the assets received was only around 3%.
72. Id. at 1069. This statement contains additional significance in light of the fact that there
were also § 1031(a) excluded assets in the underlying property.
73. In this regard, Long may be distinguished from Pappas by the fact that in Pappas per-
sonalty existed only in the underlying assets of the partnership interest received and not in the
interest exchanged. Long could merely be giving effect to the rationale promulgated in Rev.
Rul. 57-365, 1957-2 C.B. 52, which held that an exchange of all the realty and personalty (except
inventory and securities) comprising the business of one operating telephone company for all
the similar assets of another such company is an exchange to which § 1031 applies.
Though Pappas apparently exceeds the parameters of the ruling, the proposition that an ex-
change of a partnership holding primarily personalty for one holding primarily realty will not
qualify under § 1031(a) can be reasonably asserted. Such an exchange would thus fail the second-
tier analysis.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 49-61.
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terest constituting boot, the transaction is not necessarily tax-free. Gain may
still be recognized by virtue of section 1031(d) if a taxpayer is relieved of
liabilities associated with the underlying assets of the exchanged partnership
interest.
In Long the court addressed for the first time the problem of whether gain
realized on a partnership exchange pursuant to section 1031(d) should be
recognized to the extent of boot received as provided in section 1031(b) and,
if so, exactly how the amount of boot should be computed. In this case, Long
was a 50% owner in both a general partnership and a joint venture." Essen-
tially the same individuals owned the remaining 50% interest in each entity.
The principal underlying assets of both the venture and partnership were mort-
gaged rental real estate. The original agreements in both entities provided that
liabilities would be allocated to partners in the same proportions as their respec-
tive partnership interests." Therefore, Long was allocated 50% of each part-
nership's liabilities. Within six weeks prior to the exchange, simultaneous
amendments were made to the agreements of both the partnership and joint
venture. The partnership amendment resulted in a reduction of liability
allocated to Long's exchanged partnership interest. The joint venture amend-
ment affecting the interest received by Long resulted in an increase in his
liability for an amount in excess of a certain sum. The bottom-line effect
was that Long decreased his liabilities relieved as a result of the exchange
while possessing the ability to increase the amount of debt assumed in the
joint venture by incurring additional liabilities. Two days before the exchange
occurred, the joint venture incurred additional debt in the amount of
$400,000.7 The interests were then exchanged, and Long reported no gain
from the exchange on his income tax return. The Commissioner assessed a
deficiency arising from unreported capital gain in the amount of $918,938,
alleging that section 1031 was inapplicable.
After determining that the exchange involved like-kind general partnership
interests, the court then applied the second tier of its analysis.78 In applying
the "substance over form" test to the underlying assets, the court concluded
that although the predominant underlying properties of both partnerships were
substantially the same,7" the $400,000 liability was incurred in an attempt to
avoid receipt of boot by Long.80 However, this manipulative effort did not
75. Actually, the case involved two taxpayers who each owned a 25% interest. In order to
avoid confusion and because the facts and results are identical for both taxpayers, reference
shall be made only to Long.
76. Furthermore, profits and losses were shared in the same manner in each entity. Accord-
ingly, Long was allocated 50% of the profits and the losses of each entity.
77. This debt was the result of a note. The cash proceeds were shown on the balance sheet
as "investments," while the liability appeared as a "note payable."
78. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1069 (1981).
79. The underlying assets consisted primarily of residential rental apartment complexes held
for investment.
80. The court noted that the effect of the partnership amendment was to substantially reduce
Long's shared liabilities. It further noted that he appropriately reduced his basis under I.R.C.
§ 733 to reflect this debt reduction. The court found that, although the amount of gain to be
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cause the transaction to fall outside the purview of section 1031. Therefore,
the court had to determine how gain under section 1031(b) should be com-
puted, i.e., whether it should be done on a partnership-asset-by-partnership-
asset basis or on a partnership-entity basis, which would result in recognition
only to the extent provided in subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code."'
The court held that gain recognized should be determined by applying the
entity theory because it had consistently relied on this theory when analyzing
whether an exchange qualified under section 1031(a).82 Consequently, Long
was required to recognize gain on the exchange to the extent that liabilities
of which he was relieved in the transfer of his interest in the partnership ex-
ceeded the liabilities assumed on receipt of the interest in the joint venture.
In determining the amount of liabilities relieved and assumed, the court decided
that the amendments had no substance other than their impact on the taxability
of the transaction and would not be given effect.8 3 The court then analyzed
the nature of the liabilities and allocated them according to the regulations
and the original terms of the partnership and joint venture agreements.4 This
resulted in a determination that Long had been relieved of net liabilities in
the amount of $1,049,734, instead of $6,680 as he had reported.8 5 Under Long,
recognized is preserved due to the basic reduction, the partners could always avoid receipt of
boot by manipulating liabilities so long as they had sufficient basis to absorb the decrease in
liabilities. For this reason, the court concluded that the amendments still had substantial tax
effect despite the fact that the partner's basis reflected the debt reduction.
81. Subchapter K is the portion of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with the taxation of
partnerships.
82. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1071 (1981). Other reasons advanced were: (1)
it respects the special recognition provisions within subchapter K; (2) numerous technical prob-
lems that would arise if the aggregate approach were adopted are avoided. See supra text accom-
panying note 70.
83. Long argued that substantial business reasons existed for the amendments because of
his concern with his personal liability in the floundering, cash-poor partnerships. Also, Long
gave up his right to guaranteed payments from the partnership in order to have his liabilities
reduced. Furthermore, it was argued that the 400,000 liability incurred immediately before the
exchange was for the purpose of repairing the roof of the rental complex. None of these conten-
tions withstood the court's scrutiny.
84. In computing the amount of liabilities relieved in the partnership interest exchanged, the
court made an unusual allocation. It first noted the general rule in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e)
whereby liabilities of a general partnership are allocated according to the partners' ratio for shar-
ing losses under the partnership agreement. It then mentioned the provision in the regulation
requiring nonrecourse liabilities to be allocated in the same proportion as the partners share profits.
After this discussion, the court decided that liabilities in the partnership exchanged should
be allocated in the ratio that the partners shared losses. This is significant in light of the fact
that, of the $2,815,658 liability associated with the underlying partnership property, $2,400,000
was nonrecourse. However, the court took notice of the fact that three of the partners were
personally liable on the debt to the extent of $1,191,458. Accordingly, the court indicated that
the personal guaranty of a nonrecourse loan by individual partners, outside their capacity as
partners, transforms the debt so that partnership liabilities should be allocated in a recourse fashion.
The effect of this approach in Long was immaterial because profits and losses in each entity
were shared 50-50. However, if the court were to adopt this approach generally, the effect on
the basis computation to limited partners would be much more substantial. See 1 W. McKEE,
W. NELSON & R. WHIMIRE, supra note 6 at 8.01-8.04.
85. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1080 (1981).
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the "substance over form" doctrine will be applied to all facets of a partner-
ship exchange and amendments should be supported by valid business
reasons.
8 6
Because the court in Long held that gain must be recognized under section
1031(b) in this type of transaction, the question then arose as to whether Long
was entitled to a step-up in the basis of his partnership interest for any por-
tion of the gain recognized. The amount of depreciation allowed on the joint
venture assets acquired was dependent on the answer to this question. The
court held that, in order to be consistent with the partnership entity approach
as applied to section 1031, section 1031(d) allowed a full-basis step-up.," The
interplay of the subchapter K provisions in the court's analysis merits atten-
tion. The court began at section 1031(d), which provides that the basis of
the taxpayer's joint venture interest is equal to the basis in the property ex-
changed, a 50% partnership interest, plus the gain recognized on the
exchange." However, as a result of the exchange of a 50% interest, the joint
venture terminated under section 708(b)(1)(B).89 The termination's effect was
that the old joint venture made a liquidating distribution to the taxpayer in
which no gain or loss was recognized to the partners under section 731(a),
or to the joint venture under section 731(b).9 Section 732(b)91 provides that
the bases of joint venture assets distributed are stepped-up to equal the ad-
justed basis of the partner's interest. A new joint venture is deemed to be
formed which is then entitled to this stepped-up basis under section 72392 upon
the constructive contribution of that property by the partner. Instead of dissolv-
ing this new entity, Long continued to operate it as a new 50% owner. In
continuing the joint venture's operation, Long would thus receive the benefit
of depreciation deductions on the entire amount of the stepped-up bases.93
86. In a footnote, the court in Long stated that amendments to the partnership agreement
by the partners are permitted and will be effective if they are adopted prior to or at the time
the partnership return is due for that taxable year. I.R.C. § 761(c). The court further stated
that all allocations must have economic substance and cited Holladay v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
571 (1979), aff'd 649 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1981); Kresser v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
77 T.C. at 1078. See I.R.C. § 704(b)(2).
87. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1085 (1981).
88. Id. at 1083.
89. I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B). The Commissioner did not argue that the termination caused the
transaction to fall outside § 1031. The court stated that it considered this result correct in view
of Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(iv). Id.
90. I.R.C. §§ 731(a), (b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(iv), where the sequence of the termina-
tion of the old partnership and formation of the new partnership as a result of termination
is explained.
91. I.R.C. § 732(b).
92. I.R.C. § 723.
93. The Commissioner argued that such treatment would result in a double benefit to Long
to the extent of his negative capital account in the partnership whose interest he exchanged.
This negative balance, argued the Commissioner, was a result of the allocation of losses in the
partnership and represented prior tax deductions.
The court disposed of this argument by explaining that it used the alternative method authorized
in Code § 705(b) to compute the taxpayer's basis. Therefore, Long's negative bases, in effect,
increased his gain recognized.
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The court then observed that, at the price of a tax at capital gains rates,
taxpayers would be entitled to greater depreciation deductions, which would
then offset future ordinary income. Although this observation is correct, sec-
tion 751 mitigates the value of such a result."' That section provides that
amounts realized from certain property by a partner in exchange for all or
a part of his partnership interest will be considered as being derived from
ordinary income property.9s This is an exception to the general rule found
in section 741 that a partnership interest is to be treated as a capital asset.
Section 751 property includes appreciated inventory items and unrealized
receivables. Unrealized receivables is defined to encompass depreciation recap-
ture under sections 1245 and 1250.96 Therefore, if the underlying assets of
an exchanged partnership interest consist of inventory or other property sub-
ject to recapture, and gain is recognized on the exchange, capital gain is con-
verted into ordinary income.97 Because, in general, very few partnerships can
exist without the presence of such assets, it would seem rare for a taxpayer
to receive a basis step-up pursuant to sections 1031(b) and (d) solely from
gain recognized at capital gain rates.
Conclusion
Case law firmly establishes that an exchange of partnership interests may
be initially considered for section 1031 treatment. In determining whether the
94. I.R.C. § 751.
95. Section 751 assets have posed an intriguing problem in considering the effects of tax-free
exchanges of partnership interests. The problem arises when an exchange occurs and qualifies
at the first-tier analysis. However, included in the underlying assets is property described by
§ 751. Assuming that, under § 1031, no gain realized should otherwise be recognized, there ap-
pears to be no authority for carrying over the § 751 ordinary-income taint to the acquired part-
nership assets.
It has been argued that this property should be treated separately from the § 1031 transaction
with gain recognized appropriately. Another possibility would be that § 751 overrides § 1031.
Neither of these possibilities seems likely. The first is improbable because it would be inconsis-
tent with the entity approach repeatedly applied by the court. In the context of parenthetically
excluded property located in the partnerships, the court has used the entity approach so that
this property is not separately treated as resulting in gain recognized. The existence of § 751
property in the underlying assets should be deemed analogous. The second possibility is unlikely
because this section could be construed to be a characterization section just as § 741 was in
Pappas. Therefore, it would never corhe into operation unless gain was recognized under § 1031.
Perhaps the more likely approach would be for the court to consider the nature of the partner-
ship activities. If the nature of the activities mandates the presence of such assets and the amounts
are reasonable, § 1031 should still apply. However, if the court determines that the existence
of such assets constitutes an abuse, then the transaction should fall outside § 1031. In any event,
it should be remembered that the purpose of § 751 is to prevent the conversion of ordinary
income into capital gain. For the court to adopt this approach without somehow maintaining
this taint would be to circumvent that purpose.
96. I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250.
97. A definite unintended benefit occurred in Long, where the taxpayer was allowed to take
accelerated depreciation on the underlying assets exchanged. However, the Commissioner failed
to assert the § 751 issue, which would have resulted in a portion of the capital gain recognized
from the § 1031 exchange being ordinary income. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1081 (1981).
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transaction qualifies for nonrecognition under that section, the Tax Court
has consistently used a two-tier analysis. The court recognizes the partnership
entities in its first-tier analysis, while piercing this entity in applying its second-
tier analysis.
In the first-tier analysis, the court has repeatedly held exchanges of general
partnership interests to be "like-kind" under section 1031(a). However, even
in this situation, care should be taken to assure that the general partnership
interest Cannot be recharacterized as a limited one, thereby precluding
nonrecognition treatment; this statement is supported by the court's holding
in Meyer that an exchange of a general partnership interest in return for a
limited interest does not qualify as like-kind, even though the underlying assets
of the partnerships are identical. Moreover, when limited partnership interests
are exchanged, the Commissioner may contend that the interests constitute
"securities" and thus should be denied section 1031 treatment because of the
parenthetical language in section 1031(a).
After Long and Pappas, the court's methodology in its second-tier analysis
appears consistent and should provide a degree of predictability. Nonetheless,
in examining the underlying assets of the partnerships to determine if they
are of a like-kind, the court applies a test that is more certain in theory than
in application. Although capable of being phrased in a variety of ways, the
standard seems to be that if substantially all of the assets could be exchanged
tax-free outside the partnership form, the exchange will qualify for nonrecogni-
tion treatment though the assets are located within a partnership. Another
formulation is that if the underlying property of the partnerships is substan-
tially the same and includes an insignificant amount of excluded assets, the
exchange qualifies for section 1031 treatment.
In any event, the test applied by the court is definitely not one of
mathematical certainty. The analysis begs the question as to what amount
of assets must qualify for nonrecognition before it constitutes "substantially
all of the partnership's assets." in making this determination, the court focuses
on prevention of abuse through utilization of the partnership form to ac-
complish a tax-free transaction that could not have otherwise been achieved.
However, the court recognizes that because of the inherent nature of the part-
nership form, the operative requirements of section 1031 must be applied in
a less stringent fashion. Thus, a reasonable amount of inventory or cash on
hand within the partnership does not constitute abuse. A "reasonable amount"
of such assets will probably depend upon the nature of the partnership ac-
tivities. Accordingly, if the amount of dissimilar assets or excluded property
is not unreasonable, their presence will not automatically be deemed abusive
and result in gain recognition under section 1031(b).
Furthermore, the judicial test does not distinguish the effect of the presence
of excluded assets, and it appears such assets are simply included with the
underlying dissimilar property in determining whether the requisite amount
of assets would qualify for a tax-free exchange but for the partnership.98 The
98. This result is not only logical but consistent with § 1031(b), which provides, in effect,
that both dissimilar and excluded assets are to be treated as boot. There is, therefore, no ap-
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